Military Defense News: Stop Panicking About Russian “Hybrid” Warfare

There is currently a great deal of alarmist concern, triggered by a recent RAND report, about Russia’s supposed ability to conquer the Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, three former Soviet republics that are now part of NATO — and thus drive a wedge into NATO without the West being able to do anything to stop it.

But before we start to panic, it’s important to consider not just whether Moscow might ever actually want to do this, but also all the many ways in which the West could retaliate other than with military force. There are, after all, more ways to win wars than just with tanks and fighters.

The reality is that not only does Russia likely have zero ambitions to capture the Baltic states in the first place, but even if it did, the US and NATO could do a whole lot to punish it for doing so.

That’s because for all the talk of Russia’s brilliant use of “asymmetric” or “hybrid” warfare — that is, fighting not so much on the regular battlefield but by using all kinds of sneaky and unconventional approaches, from information and cyber warfare to political manipulation — the truth is that if anyone has an “asymmetric” or “hybrid” edge, it is actually the West.

Read the Remainder at Vox

Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, hybrid warfare has become conversational short form in the West for describing Moscow’s sneaky ways of fighting war. If there’s one thing you’ve learned over the past two years about Russia, it’s that it uses hybrid warfare, a dangerous Kremlin innovation the West must learn to grapple with. In two short years, the word has mutated from describing how Moscow was fighting its war in Ukraine to incorporating all the various elements of Russian influence and national power. The term continues to evolve, spawning iterations like “multi-vector hybrid warfare” in Europe. Hybrid warfare has become the Frankenstein of the field of Russia military analysis; it has taken on a life of its own and there is no obvious way to contain it.

In trying to separate hybrid warfare from the classical bins of conventional or irregular war, I prefer to use Frank Hoffman’s definition, “a tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behavior in the same time and battlespace to obtain [a group’s] political objectives.” There are other definitions out there, but you will find they are not being applied correctly to analysis of Russian tactics. Unfortunately, what Russian hybrid warfare is, and how it works, varies dramatically depending on what article, report, or PowerPoint brief you are reading. The more we have talked about it, the less we understand it as a useful concept or framework for looking at Russian actions.

What’s wrong with a little hybrid warfare?

If you torture hybrid warfare long enough it will tell you anything, and torture it we have. The term now covers every type of discernible Russian activity, from propaganda to conventional warfare, and most that exists in between. What exactly does Russian hybrid warfare do, and how does it work? The short answer in the Russia-watcher community is everything. The church of Russian hybrid warfare has a broad and influential following these days, but finds few worshippers among experts who study the Russian military. There’s a reason for that: Many don’t believe it exists as described. I’m not the first to point out the problems with applying this lens to Russian tactics , and I have criticized itelsewhere, but in this piece I hope to offer a fresh perspective on why the national security establishment continues to do itself a disservice by thinking about Russia through a hybrid warfare lens.

My purpose here is not to engage in an esoteric disagreement over military terms and definitions. It matters less what we call it if there is a common and useful understanding of the subject. The trouble is that thanks to narratives surrounding hybrid warfare, we lack a shared knowledge of how Russia fights and what happened on the battlefields of Ukraine. Without a common understanding of the facts here, the United States cannot hope to successfully counter or deter Moscow elsewhere. It would be one thing for such notions to dominate the world of punditry, but the references to Russia’s dark hybrid arts permeate the conversation among U.S. policymakers and leading generals alike. I have nothing against hybrid warfare as a concept, but in the case of Russia, it has become more of a handicap than an enabler for our decision-makers and military leaders.

Read the Remainder at War on the Rocks

Going Inside the Ukrainian Power Grid Hack

IT WAS 3:30 p.m. last December 23, and residents of the Ivano-Frankivsk region of Western Ukraine were preparing to end their workday and head home through the cold winter streets. Inside the Prykarpattyaoblenergo control center, which distributes power to the region’s residents, operators too were nearing the end of their shift. But just as one worker was organizing papers at his desk that day, the cursor on his computer suddenly skittered across the screen of its own accord.

He watched as it navigated purposefully toward buttons controlling the circuit breakers at a substation in the region and then clicked on a box to open the breakers and take the substation offline. A dialogue window popped up on screen asking to confirm the action, and the operator stared dumbfounded as the cursor glided to the box and clicked to affirm. Somewhere in a region outside the city he knew that thousands of residents had just lost their lights and heaters.

The operator grabbed his mouse and tried desperately to seize control of the cursor, but it was unresponsive. Then as the cursor moved in the direction of another breaker, the machine suddenly logged him out of the control panel. Although he tried frantically to log back in, the attackers had changed his password preventing him from gaining re-entry. All he could do was stare helplessly at his screen while the ghosts in the machine clicked open one breaker after another, eventually taking about 30 substations offline. The attackers didn’t stop there, however. They also struck two other power distribution centers at the same time, nearly doubling the number of substations taken offline and leaving more than 230,000 residents in the dark. And as if that weren’t enough, they also disabled backup power supplies to two of the three distribution centers, leaving operators themselves stumbling in the dark.

Read the Remainder at Wired

How NATO Can Disrupt Russia’s New Way of War

Here are a few things the West can do against Moscow’s potent combo of special forces and electronic warfare.

The Ukrainian soldiers peered over the cold dirt edge of their trench. The artillery had abated, but the whine of a nearby spotter UAV promised its imminent return. In the distance, they could see camouflaged spetsnaz moving into position with suppressed Vintorez marksman rifles. Looking at his radio, a lieutenant dared to hope. “Aleksei, you see this? Radio’s working. Maybe a break in the jamming.” “Is that really a good thing?” his sergeant responded. “Go ahead and call, that’s what they want. The Russians will hear you first and send their thermobaric regards. That is if the spetsnaz don’t get here first.” The young officer slumped. His comms gear was useless; he and his men were cut off and alone.

Much has been written about Russia’s innovative concepts of operations in Ukraine and Syria, variously dubbed “hybrid” or “non-linear” war, but specific tactics have received far less scrutiny than they deserve. A look, in particular, at Russia’s use of electronic warfare (EW) and special operations forces (SOF) suggests ways that U.S. and other NATO forces might prepare to counter them.

Technology and new EW doctrines have accelerated thedecades-old competition between active attack systems and countermeasures, shortening the evolutionary cycle from weeks and months to mere hours. In The Nature and Content of New-Generation War, sometimes described as a “how-to manual” for the seizure of Crimea, two senior Russian military officers note the importance of EW in the Gulf War and assert the need for sustained “electronic knockdown” attacks in future conflicts. They recommend that Russian ground forces “be continually improved and equipped with…EW capabilities.”

The positioning of EW forces in the Russian order-of-battleunderscores their importance. Every military district houses an independent EW brigade, supplemented by strategic battalions with specialized EW equipment and a special independent EWbrigade carrying the title “Supreme Main Command” (only two other units in the Russian Armed Forces reportedly carry this title).

In Ukraine, Russia frequently jams its enemies’ tactical communications through a variety of means. During the initial Crimean seizure, cellphones in the area were reportedlyjammed by Russian warships. As the conflict moved to the Donbas, pro-Ukrainian and OSCE UAVs found their data links persistently jammed. Further, Russian UAVs that can carry theLeyer-3 jammer and direct artillery fire have been spotted inUkraine and Syria. Where Ukrainian forces have acquired encrypted radios, Russian EW troops hone in on their stronger signal to geolocate their position. These and many similar tactics enable Russia to erode its adversaries’ intelligence-gathering, communications, and command and control.

Russian EW gear may even threaten strategic collection platforms. For instance, the Murmansk-BN long-range jammer was recently deployed to Crimea, and the Krasukha-4 advancedEW system has been observed in bothUkraine and Syria. Even though the technical capabilities of these two systems are likely exaggerated for propaganda purposes, they are believed to have the potential to interfere with low-earth orbit spy satellites, airborne surveillance platforms, and other collection systems. In any case, their deployment certainly allows them to prove their capabilities against advanced U.S. and NATO platforms.

Russia also uses its EW capabilities to amplify the effectiveness of its special operations forces, the “little green men” used to such noteworthy effect in Ukraine. In his famous article on hybrid warfare, Gen. Valery Gerasimov asserts that SOF and internal opposition are used “to create a permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state…” To the authors of The Nature and Content of New-Generation War, SOF are maneuverable shock infantry that gather targeting information for Russian strikes and “roll over” weakened enemies. Retired Colonel-General Anatoly Zaitsev writes how the ultimate goal of SOF “is to destroy the enemy’s critical facilities and disrupt or destroy his forces’ systems.” Russia’s renewed interest in SOF is further illustrated by the creation of the elite Komanda Spetsial’nikh Operatsiy (KSO) command and deployment of various SOF forces in Ukraine and Syria.

It’s hard to comprehensively track Russian SOF, but they have been observed operating throughout Ukraine. At the beginning of the conflict, KSO and naval spetsnaz units seized several strategic sites, including airports, surface-to-air missile batteries, Ukrainian military facilities, and the Crimean parliament building. As the conflict shifted to the Donbas, otherSOF elements were deployed to protect Russian technical trainers, instill control over the separatists’ chain of command, and train and support separatist fighters.

In Syria, the Russian SOF deployment is more ambiguous and less overt. KSO elements have recently been“redeployed” from Ukraine to help coordinate Russian airstrikes. In addition, “highly-secretive” Zaslon SOFpersonnel have been deployed to guard sensitive Russian equipment, personnel, and information. Additional SOF activity is likely as Russia’s involvement in Syria expands.

Moscow has proven adept at using EW and SOF in concert to fragment and slow adversaries’ strategic decision-making. While “little green men” secure key locations and train local forces, electronic-warfare forces distort ISR collection by adversaries and third parties, limiting their ability to project an accurate counter-narrative to inform confused domestic audiences and a divided international community. And even when a defender does manage to grasp the situation, RussianEW attacks on their command, control, communications, and intelligence disrupts their response.

Nations threatened by Russia’s hybrid warfare can strengthen their resilience through investing in two areas. First, build stronger and more redundant C3I by encrypting radio, data links, and satellite communications, and developing promising new technologies such as cognitive EW. Although Russia’s advanced EW capabilities can attack nearly any system, redundancy can limit their impact. Second, improve the ability to monitor and understand the battlespace by improving tacticalISR. UAVs are key: hand-launched ones, medium-altitude drones with greater endurance, and airborne ISR platforms with electro-optical/infrared sensors and signals intelligence payloads—all of which must be supported by secure data links.

Yet since no single platform or system provides a silver-bullet solution to hybrid warfare, the U.S. and its NATO partners must explore developing new operating concepts; for example, ground forces should be prepared to mimic the U.S. Navy’s “emissions control” by operating in the absence of a data network. They must increase joint training against conventional and unconventional Russian military scenarios, allowing NATO to strengthen its response, practice its interoperability, and and signal its defensive resolve. Ultimately, they must learn how to assess their own prowess, doctrine, strategy and tactics against an adversary whose expertise in hybrid warfare is growing by the day.

Read the Original Article at Defense One

Is Putin Really Dr. Moriarty?

An excellent article on understanding how Russian Hybrid Warfare manipulates the current geo-political spectrum. -SF

We know ISIS is bad because it killed people in San Bernardino and Paris. We know Iran is bad because it’s still developing nuclear weapons. We know Russia is bad…because…well, didn’t Charlie Rose once say something about that? Or was it Seth MacFarlane? Either way, as Americans, we know there is a threat from Putin’s Russia, but many of us (including, of course, Donald Trump) aren’t quite sure why.

Don’t feel bad for sleeping on Russia. Thanks to a hybrid of information operations, psychological warfare and espionage, Russia has evaded the scrutiny afforded ISIS, Iran and even North Korea. But while we had little excuse for our blindness to Russia’s actions in 2012, when Barack Obama laughed at Mitt Romney’s assertion that Russia was a preeminent geopolitical threat, we have absolutely no excuse now.

Russia has short-circuited the Syrian peace talks. Their subs are more active than during the Cold War. They have a bad habit ofintercepting American aircraft. And Russia is beginning to dominate deep space.  From partnering with Iran to selling radioactive material to ISIS, Vladimir Putin’s fingerprints are on a lot of bad juju.

You know that moment when James Bond finds out all the bad stuff happening around the globe is because of SPECTRE? Or when Sherlock Holmes suddenly realizes that Dr. Moriarty is the one pulling the strings of seemingly unrelated bad guys all over London?

For lack of a better simplification, Vladimir Putin is Dr. Moriarty. He is SPECTRE. And, like every Bond villain, Putin has given the world a preview of his vision. After trying time and again to make nice, even the Obama administration is starting to see him for what he is.

Here’s what you should know.

Putin knows how to do active measures. Or do you believe the CIA created AIDS to kill black people?

Since the 1980s, everyone from Louis Farrakhan to Spike Lee has run with that myth. According to the Washington Post, as recently as 2005 almost 50% of African-Americans believed either the government or the CIA was behind the creation of AIDS.

The fact that such a fine artifact of Soviet propaganda is still making the rounds in mainstream precincts is a testament to Russia’s historical excellence at disinformation. The Soviets excelled at stirring up discontent and mistrust between the government and Western underclasses, creating incidents, developing narratives and exploiting internal tensions to weaken their geopolitical enemies from within.

In that light, it’s not too surprising that the Kremlin-backed Russia Today RT, was one of the most persistent broadcasters to focus on the Ferguson riots and the major urban unrest that followed them. RT is merely a sequel to the Soviet-era subversion of I.F. Stone and Walter Duranty, dressed up as a news network and hiding in plain sight. Why America has let RT wrap itself in the First Amendment and bullhorn its way into 85 million homes is a question that deserves a better answer than we’ve heard so far.

Bearing the subversively appropriate slogan “Question More,” RT has enlisted names from Larry King to Ed Schultz to front the operation. From Congressman Dana Rohrabacher to Nation editor Katrina vanden Heuvel,RT has shown a knack for attracting guests and contributors from across the political spectrum who are willing to, at least temporarily, hold their nose and give RT the air of legitimacy. Of course, how much nose-holding is going on is a bit of a question. How many Western journalists, academics and talking heads are on Putin’s payroll and how many are simply “useful idiots?” Certain contributors like Alex Jones and Stephen F. Cohen hardly need coaxing to offer pro-Putinist declarations. Others, such as Mike Flynn and Matt Drudge seem to treat RT with a bit more suspicion.

Most Americans seem only to notice the biases of CNN, Fox News and MSNBC, their skepticism evaporating when a network anchor with a foreign accent speaks to the camera. Even when those anchors end up leaving and revealing the intentions of their former employers.

To be fair, RT is hardly the only media outlet at Putin’s disposal. Most people remember the outing of Maxim model Anna Chapman as a Russian spy. Most people don’t remember that Vicky Pelaez was busted as part of the same spy ring. Pelaez was a political columnist for El Diario (the most popular Spanish-language newspaper), where she had been writing for over 20 years, blasting US foreign policy while praising Fidel Castro, Hugo Chavez and the Maoist-influenced Shining Path guerillas.

But no Russian-linked media outlet is more notorious than the much-hyped Wikileaks.

Whether Wikileaks has been “infiltrated” by Russian agents or has simply been a creation of Russia from the start is a question that history will have to answer. But even casual news consumers have trouble understanding why a website trying to be an “open-source democratic intelligence agency” seems tunnel-visioned on the West, routinely failing to expose the crimes and foibles of Russia or its allies.

Wikileaks first caught the American imagination with the release of Bradley Manning’s “War Logs.” Whether Manning was recruited by Wikileaks founder Julian Assange to gather information or whether he simply fell into Assange’s lap is a matter of debate. Regardless, his leaks helped Al-Qaeda’s recruiting, made other nations wary of intelligence-sharing with the US and are credited with starting the Arab Spring. (To be sure, Canada’s had its own version of Manning, who had much stronger ties to Russia.)

Regardless of how faint hand Russia may have played in the Manning episode, Manning’s leaks have gone on to benefit Russia as much, if not more, than any other entity; as the Arab Spring weakened US influence in the Middle East, it created a vacuum that Russia has gone on to fill.

Of course, Wikileaks was only getting going.

It’s been speculated that Edward Snowden was first approached by Russian intelligence in Geneva in 2007. There is also reason to believe that he may have been recruited in New Delhi in 2010 (India has a long history of collaboration with Russia). Regardless, at this point, it is an open secret that Snowden was already a Russian agent before he stole over 1 million documents and fled, ultimately, to that bastion of individual freedom, transparency and free speech, Moscow.

It’s hard not to notice that Snowden’s emergence in Moscow has coincided with Russia’s muscular foreign policy moves. From Crimea to Iraq to Japan, Putin has had an uncanny ability to detect the blind spots of his enemies (NATO and the US). Snowden’s intelligence has had the effect of making Putin look like the cunning genius he’s always wanted to be.

Sadly, Putin’s tactics go beyond disinformation and espionage. His ability to manipulate, control and exploit adversaries has been on full display in Russia itself where his own FSB has instigated, facilitated or, in some cases, actually performed terrorist actions in order to ease his political ascension, as infamously seen in Chechnya in 1999. It was not the last time Putin offered himself as a cure to a disease of his own making.

The Mitrokhin documents first opened Western eyes to the possibility of Russian collusion with international terrorists. Since then, Russia’s close partnership with Iran in Syria makes one wonder how close Russia also is to its proxy armies such as Hezbollah.

In that context, the curious ties between Russia and the Boston Marathon bombers leave more questions than answers.

Oh, but there’s so much more. The San Bernardino and Paris attackers both used Telegram, a Russian-developed encryption app designed, in the wake of the Snowden revelations, to work around NSA eavesdropping. Interesting. Maybe coincidental.

But then, coincidences abound in the San Bernardino case. As we now know, the shooters got their weapons from a straw purchaser, Sayed Farook’s friend, Enrique Marquez. Despite reportedly being a, well, slow individual, Marquez was married, to a hot, blond Russian number, Mariya Chernykh. Mariya had a sister, Tatiana who was married to…Sayed Farook’s brother. Both girls are Russian Jews from Western Russia whose parents have emigrated to Israel. Though the words “agent” and “provocateur” come to mind, it may be decades before we find out the truth.

While the number of Russian fingerprints on the San Bernardino attack were curious, they may also be small potatoes. In a revealing interview with a former FSB officer, a Ukranian newspaper tied Russia to the actual formation of ISIS, noting that it was Moscow-trained Baathists who founded the Islamic State.

In response to ISIS’ attacks and the Syrian refugee crisis right-wing, pro-Putinist parties have sprung up in reaction to the reflexively politically correct approach of the EU establishment. Has Putin created a problem that only he could solve? Is Europe in 2016 going to be like the Chechnya of 1999?

As if that wasn’t enough, Russian-backed gangs have been looking for ISIS buyers for enough cesium — a radioactive material — to contaminate several city blocks. Where did the cesium come from? All signs pointed to Russia, but Putin has blocked any attempts to track the cesium back to a Russian reactor.

Putin’s strategy is not one of ad hoc assassinations or big-score arms deals; it is far more encompassing than that. Putin has placed himself at the center of a spiderweb of organized crime, rogue nation states and terrorist groups; Putin has set himself up to be the instigator, middleman and/or even executor of everything from nuclear proliferation to domestic unrest while churning out enough disinformation and propaganda to blur his silhouette.

Dr. Moriarty would be impressed. After all, he never got to talk to Larry King.

Read the Original Article at The Havok Journal