Time to Think About “Hybrid Defense”

By Mark Galeotti

If the new threat is so complex, political, and subtle, shouldn’t the response be the same?

Much is made these days of the new challenge to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from “hybrid warfare” — the kind of blended military-political-intelligence-economic operations Russia has launched in Ukraine. Whether or not this really is something new can be debated, as should whether it ought really be called something else. In any case, it certainly now shapes the Western defense agenda. But if the threat is so complex and political, maybe Western countries need to be thinking more sharply and imaginatively about counter-measures? A “hybrid defense”?

After all, given that NATO is a military alliance, it is hardly surprising that it is concentrating on military means. Thus, U.S. heavy armor is to be prepositionedin the Baltic states, and a rolling series of exercises are seeing NATO troops and special forces in particular wargaming various scenarios, including the kind of unacknowledged, unidentified Russian “little green men” who took Crimea.

This is all admirable and useful, but Moscow’s current approach is based on theguerrilla’s basic maxims: avoid doing the obvious, play to your strengths rather than your opponent’s, and never get caught in a straight fight with a stronger enemy. If Russia ever does decide to make any moves against NATO, it will be with the intention of avoiding any direct war with an alliance that can outfight, outgun, and outman it. And it will try to avoid making a move for which the West is ready.

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Vehicle Ambush v2.0

 

The definition of hybrid warfare designates a combination of tactics and strategies; some from the conventional school, some from the asymmetrical and some from the cyber. It is this integration of cyber techniques that can make traditional and asymmetric battlefield strategies much more deadly and efficient.

Imagine this: a small insurgent force, (platoon strength or around 30 men) is planning a vehicle ambush on a convoy of enemy trucks thought to be carrying small arms, ammunition and explosives. The plan is to ambush the trucks, kill the drivers and soldiers guarding it and confiscate the weapons. The standard “L” ambush is agreed upon, and positions assigned (In this case, for the sake of clarity, the platoon is divided up into 3 “Elements”; Assault, Support and Security. The team leader of the Assault element is told  that the goal is the safe retrieval of the weapons and explosives; not the destruction of them, so pass along the word to it is crucial that the drivers are killed first so there is a smaller chance for escape. After the drivers, then focus on the small contingent of guards, which we estimate only to be around 10 men with small arms. Once all the specifics have been worked out, a key member of the ambush team, the “Cyber” element speaks.

“I will start hacking the internal systems of the lead vehicle 1/8 mile from the ambush zone, killing all the electronics in a systematic fashion and hopefully immobilizing the lead vehicle here, at or around point here.” The cyber-tech points to a spot on the map marked “Kill Box”. “Once the lead vehicle is immobilized, the other vehicles will be forced to stop and will be unable to turn around due to a blocking action of the rear element. It is imperative that the ambush starts ONLY after the lead vehicle is immobile. If the enemy are alerted to our presence too early, they will surely call for reinforcements and with the QRF response times we have monitored averaging 12 to 15 minutes, combined with the distance from the nearest base, they will be on top of us in under 45 to 50 minutes, so it is imperative that 5 minutes before the ambush, all cell phone and radio freqs are jammed by our Commo (Communications Officer). Once the lead vehicle is immobile, it will be the job of the support element to execute a blocking formation by moving our ‘requisitioned’ school bus across the road to prevent escape. With the lead vehicle immobile and the rear exit blocked, the remaining guards will either fight or flee, if they run, it will be the job of the security elements to scoop them up. Once the guards are eliminated or captured, trucks will be searched for GPS beacons and disabled. Seeing the trucks are still driveable, they will then be driven out, if not, and they are damaged, arms and ammo will be unloaded into our trucks, this will eat up valuable time, so again, all efforts must be made not to damage the enemy vehicles during the ambush!”

Now although the above is presented as a fictional “what could be” event, a recent article in WIRED showed just how easy hacking and hijacking a vehicles internal computer can be with the right gear and know-how.

If one wanted to go even further on the “what if” scale, consider if local municipality or statewide infrastructure like traffic lights, CCTV cameras (for operational surveillance) train crossings, HOV Lanes and even drawbridge controls were hacked for the purpose of physically stopping or slowing down a vehicle so an ambush, assassination, robbery, etc., could take place.

Hollywood of course, has picked up on this theme, but focusing mainly on just the “cyber” side of things and not the “hybrid” integration we are discussing.  In the Showtime series Homeland, the United States VP’s Pacemaker is hacked by a terrorist group causing rapid heart arrhythmia and eventually death. Again, considering what the OPM hack showed us in how sensitive data (like sensitive medical records for example) are vulnerable to manipulation, this is something to consider as we traverse what will most likely be known in history as the 21st “Cyber” Century.

The “Hybrid” integration of cyber threats with asymmetrical warfare has unlimited possibilities. Of course what I have hypothesized here today is thinking very “small” in terms of overall strategy, but I wanted to show that for all practical purposes, these types of hybrid tactics, when planned and executed with violence of action, can and will work.

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The Bolshevik Legacy of Hybrid Warfare

 

Author: Pavel Luzin

The term ‘hybrid’ or ‘proxy’ warfare became more widely-used in international political terminology after Russia annexed Crimea and then subsequently turned chronic socio-economic issues to the point of a full-scale war in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine.

The Essence of Hybrid Warfare

Hybrid warfare is essentially when one country acts aggressively against the government and army of another by mobilizing rebels or combatants within the country under attack. Unofficially, the rebels or combatants supply weapons, volunteers and military experts. On their side, whole combatant units can secretly fight the aggressor state. On behalf of the rebels, alternative public authorities are created, which are in fact completely controlled by the aggressor as its proxy force. In reality it is an international conflict between two states but inaccurately portrayed as an internal political and civil conflict.

It is fairly easy for military and other experts to identify a hybrid war. It is much more difficult for other actors, including the state political institutions, those interested in resolving the conflict and international organizations to do so. These actors simply do not know how to operate in a situation such as hybrid war, and moreover, certain principles often preclude them from getting involved. In addition, since decisions taken by political institutions are based on documented facts, the collection of which requires time, these institutions simply do not have the necessary time to react to what is happening. Russia skillfully took advantage of this major weakness in February 2014, though this is far from the first time something like this has occurred.

According to Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian general and military theorist, hybrid warfare is another method of perpetuating a policy. Modern Russia inherited this method from the Bolsheviks. The very genesis of the Bolshevik regime in Russia is founded on what we today call hybrid warfare. We cannot say, however, that it has become exclusively Russian know-how. It is important to understand that the party behind this system started in the underground and learned from its own experience. It was a political machine aimed at seizing power in Russia and abroad.

The Evolution of Hybrid Warfare

It began in the fall of 1917, when the Bolsheviks staged a coup in Russia, using the lower social strata recruited from Petrograd’s military garrison. With this assistance, they were able to seize power in what was then the Russian capital. What followed evolved into a bloody civil war. The communists used a hybrid method of conflict to assume power in Azerbaijan and Ukraine. During the Red Army offensive in Poland in the summer of 1920, the Bolsheviks attempted to launch a hybrid war by establishing the Provisional Polish Revolutionary Committee. Also, in 1920 the Bolsheviks created a proxy-state—the Far Eastern Republic—which allowed them to control the provinces east of Lake Baikal.

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