Espionage Files: 6 Spies Who Risked It All For Fame, Money, Sex, Drugs and Diamonds

Anna Chapman, a Russian spy who was busted in a New York City spy ring, enjoys celebrity status in Moscow.

These modern-day spies didn’t have strong ideological allegiances, except perhaps to the high life.

Spies. Subterfuge. Clandestine operations. Nothing gets people going like a thrilling tale of espionage — it’s no wonder that movie franchises like the Bonds and the Bournes have seen so much commercial success. These real-life spies, however, aren’t nearly as badass — and none of them were patriotically or ideologically driven. These nine spies committed espionage against the United States in the name of livin’ the high life: for the love of sex, drugs, diamonds, and fame.

Aldrich Ames, who compromised the second-largest number of CIA agents after Robert Hanssen, is one of the most notorious spies in U.S. history. A former CIA agent turned KGB mole, Ames was known for his rampant alcoholism and frequent love affairs, according to a congressional assessment of Ames’ espionage case and its implications on U.S. intelligence. After a messy and expensive divorce, coupled with his new lover’s expensive shopping sprees, Ames fell into massive debt. In an effort to alleviate his financial distresses and to continue impressing his mistress, Ames approached the KGB, and ultimately received over $4.6 million for the information he passed. Ames spent nine years as a KGB mole, spying from 1985 to 1994, and was eventually caught after a mole hunt surrounding a series of leaks pointed investigators directly to him.

Martha Dodd was a novelist and journalist — and also happened to be the daughter of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ambassador to Germany. Throughout her young adulthood, Dodd was a Nazi sympathizer who frequently met with high-level members of the Third Reich, including Hitler himself, who she claimed to be “excessively gentle and modest in his manners” — according to author and researcher Shareen Blair Brysac in her book “Chasing Hitler.” Dodd eventually turned away from the Nazi philosophy, but was recruited by one of her many lovers to become a spy for the Soviet Union. This lover convinced her to sell State Department and embassy-related secrets to the Soviets, who later assessed her as an uncertain asset —  referring to her as a “sexually decayed woman ready to sleep with any handsome man,” reported by authors Allen Weinstein and Vassiliev Weinstein in their book, “The Haunted Wood.” She spied on the U.S. from 1936 to 1957, and was eventually caught by an FBI informant who implicated her in his exposure of the Soble spy network.

Jonathan Pollard is the only American spy who was given a life sentence for providing information to an ally of the United States. As an analyst for the Naval Intelligence Command, he leaked U.S. secrets to Israel for diamonds, cash, and even “heritage” in 1987. According to NCIS, he also released classified materials on numerous occasions to South Africa, Pakistan, and China in an effort to advance his wife’s business. Pollard was busted when a colleague discovered him removing classified materials from their work center.

Read the Remainder at Task and Purpose

 

 

Espionage Books Worth A Damn: The New Spymasters

The New Spymasters: inside espionage from the Cold War to global terror, by Stephen Grey

Despite the continuing value of intelligence methods like telecommunication interception and satellite imagery, when operating against a shadowy terrorist group—especially one hiding within a civilian population—one of the best sources an intelligence organisation can have is a trusted insider who’s prepared to reveal the inside workings of the target. The decades long Cold War allowed both sides to be patient in their efforts to recruit such sources. One of the most notorious spies of that era, Kim Philby was first recruited by the Soviets in the mid 1930s. Fifteen years later he was the leading British intelligence figure in the United States, responsible for liaison with the CIA.

But there’s an intrinsic uncertainty with human sources of intelligence. The Soviets were never sure about the bona fides of their agents in the west, and were deeply suspicious of the information they passed. The risk that an agent is actually a double—still loyal to their own nation or group while posing as an agent for an adversary—always hangs heavily. In 2009 the CIA and Jordan thought they’d found a well-placed al-Qaeda insider in Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, only to have seven CIA staff killed when he detonated a suicide bomb at a CIA base in Afghanistan.

Stephen Grey’s well-researched book is a good primer in the tradecraft of human intelligence, or ‘humint’. It’s not an edifying business—ultimately a successful humint operation relies on someone being persuaded to betray their country, cause or friends. As a result, it’s a difficult ethical landscape, and both the agents themselves and their handlers face dilemmas in deciding where lines are drawn. As Grey describes, the relationship between the source and the handler works best when there’s a real bond between them—but that has to coexist with the intrinsically problematic reason for the pairing.

It’s not just the interpersonal aspects that are difficult. If the agent is inside a criminal and/or violent organisation, the agency running the operation has to decide how much criminality can be tolerated from their ‘asset’. British intelligence had to weigh the benefit of having a well-placed IRA informer (codenamed SteakKnife) against the acts that he had to be complicit in to maintain his cover. There are allegations that even murder was tolerated to keep SteakKnife’s cover intact.

The ‘classic’ spy like Philby or SteakKnife is allowed to work their way up in an organisation to be able to provide intelligence on the innermost workings and thinking of the leadership. In state-on-state intelligence that takes time, but climbing the hierarchy generally doesn’t involve involve the agent openly committing violent criminal acts. In the case of a violent organisation like the IRA, it gets harder, and the argument may have come down to the prevention of a ‘greater harm’.

Those issues perhaps become more problematic when the agent concerned is inside a terrorist group bent on inflicting mass casualties. Grey’s chapter on Jihad hints at a disturbing possibility that French intelligence was prepared to allow an inside source they were running within an extremist group to deliver a car bomb to a group in Algeria which ended up taking the life of 42 people. Given that western authorities have tended to take an approach of acting quickly to prevent terrorist attacks in their own countries whenever possible, even at the expense of blowing the cover of their intelligence sources, it’d be profoundly cynical to tolerate an act of mass murder elsewhere.

Grey’s main thesis is that humint successes like those in the Cold War or against the IRA can be replicated against even the most dangerous jihadist groups. He starts with a fair point: proselytising groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS welcome converts, so it should be possible to offer them some. Westerners have been able to get into those organisations, so it should be possible to place an agent. Of course it’s likely that’s already happening, but it’d be very dangerous work as ISIS gets increasingly paranoid about any traitors in the ranks.

Grey also takes issue with the west’s policy of pursuing a process of ‘decapitation’ of terrorist groups. Forcing them into a more cellular and less central structure reduces the strategic value of intelligence and the chance of getting an agent into a place to gather real insight. Grey also observes that the IRA wasn’t ‘decapitated’. Instead, its leadership aged and mellowed, and was eventually brought into a political process that helped end the problems. That won’t be possible if we keep rejuvenating the leadership with younger hotheads.

Grey concludes that intelligence against jihadists has ceased to be strategic. Rather than trying to understand the root causes of extremist movements, political leaders and their intelligence agencies have ‘become infected with a control-room mentality’. He quotes an intelligence agent as saying that the mission in Afghanistan was ‘not to understand the enemy but to defeat it’. By taking such a tactical view, we’ll probably end up doing neither. Practiced correctly, intelligence provides understanding at the strategic level and targeting data at the tactical level.

Read the Original Article at The Strategist

Espionage Files: Spy ‘Wearables’

Secret agents typically use tracking devices to monitor foreign adversaries, but now, U.S. spies will assess their own capabilities by outfitting (willing) intelligence personnel with body sensors.

Yes, spies have plans to spy on themselves with wearables.

“Selecting and evaluating a workforce that is well-suited for the psychological and cognitive demands of the diverse positions across the intelligence community is an important and persistent need,” states a pre-solicitation notice for interested testers.

To tackle this staffing challenge, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence will embark on MOSAIC, and harness “mobile, worn and carried sensors” for friendly signals intelligence.

The program will measure volunteers’ biometric signals during their daily activities, according the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency, the test lab of ODNI.

The biofeedback captured will relate to behavior, physiology, social dynamics, physical location and proximity, among other data sources that all will be aggregated, officials say.

This might not seem like the most novel idea from an agency whose mission is taking big risks for high payoffs, like predicting the future.

Corporations already are taking the pulse of employees with Fitbits and other health-monitoring devices to boost productivity.

But IARPA’s program is a bit more ambitious, it seems.

MOSAIC expects to allow intelligence agencies “to evaluate an individual’s psychological drivers, cognitive abilities and mental wellness and resilience,” the program announcement states.

Body diagnostics should help intelligence agencies “select the right person for the right job,” as well as “evaluate and help maintain optimal performance throughout their career,” IARPA officials say.

There also is a prediction factor to the personnel evaluation program. Data from digital accessories is expected to “anticipate changes in an individual that may impact their work effectiveness, productivity and overall health and wellness,” officials say.

With a program as intimate as this one, test subjects must provide informed consent to participate.

The intrusiveness of employee body-monitoring is an issue the corporate world currently is grappling with.

Edward McNicholas, co-leader of privacy, data security and information law at law firm Sidley Austin, recently told the Wall Street Journal that employers should take into consideration employees’ physical or mental differences when rating performance based on Fitbit metrics, Apple watch sensors and such.

“If the results of this sort of tracking led to discrimination against persons with conditions ranging from insomnia or depression or ADHD,” organizations should adjust biofeedback evaluations, he said. “We should not deny ourselves the potential benefits of these technologies by banning them,” but keep a close eye on the abuse of data from wearables so “that they do not become new ways of discriminating against people.”

During the MOSAIC program, there will be privacy safeguards in place, as well as legal, ethical and safety precautions, IARPA officials said.

Plus, researchers will study whether the body signals of an individual, in a number of situations, across time, have “convergent validity,” or are a credible source of information, officials said.

The program is so focused on factoring in context that the word is part of its title. “MOSAIC” stands for “Multimodal Objective Sensing to Assess Individuals with Context.”

The program will “test a suite of multimodal sensors to collect a range of subject-focused and situational data; build capabilities to develop an integrated model of the subject, their behaviors, and the social and physical context; and advance methods to personalize modeling approaches to develop accurate assessments of an individual over time,” the announcement states.

Researchers also will evaluate the social environment and physical surroundings of the person to help interpret the results of the sensors.

IARPA will hold an Aug. 2 workshop in the Washington area for interested academic and industry researchers.

Read the Original Article at NextGov

Espionage Files: More on Russian “Harrassment” of American Diplomats

Yesterday I posted a story from Intel News about Russian “harassment” of American Diplomats in Russia. This story tells about one incident which was definitely NOT harassment but outright assault. It remains unclear however the exact details of this case and if the American was truly a “diplomat” or a Spy. -SF

In the early morning of June 6, a uniformed Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) guard stationed outside the U.S. Embassy in Moscow attacked and beat up a U.S. diplomat who was trying to enter the compound, according to four U.S. officials who were briefed on the incident.

This previously unreported attack occurred just steps from the entrance to the U.S. Embassy complex, which is located in the Presnensky District in Moscow’s city center. After being tackled by the FSB guard, the diplomat suffered a broken shoulder, among other injuries. He was eventually able to enter the embassy and was then flown out of Russia to receive urgent medical attention, administration officials confirmed to me. He remains outside of Russia.

The attack caused a diplomatic episode behind the scenes that has not surfaced until now. The State Department in Washington called in Russian Ambassador Sergey I. Kislyak to complain about the incident, an administration official said.

The motive for the attack remains unclear. One U.S. official told me that the diplomat was seeking refuge in the embassy complex to avoid being detained by the Russian intelligence services. A different U.S. official told me the diplomat may have been working as a spy in Russia under what’s known as “diplomatic cover,” which means he was pretending to be a State Department employee.

Spokesmen for the both the State Department and the CIA declined to comment on the incident or whether or not the diplomat was in fact an undercover U.S. spy.

Read the Remainder at Washington Post

Espionage Files: The Russian “Gray War” of Diplomatic Harrassment

A notable increase in incidents of harassment of American diplomats stationed in Europe by Russian intelligence personnel appears to be part of what some officials describe as an escalating “gray war” between the US and Russia. For over a year now, American State Department personnel stationed in Europe have been complaining of a systematic campaign of “harassment and intimidation” against them and their families by Russian intelligence operatives. The campaign is allegedly being waged in Moscow and other European capitals, and has prompted one US diplomat to say that he and his colleagues were “feeling embattled out there in the embassy”. The Washington Post, which published the story on Monday, said that the diplomats’ concerns about the Russian campaign of intimidation were raised again at a recent meeting in Washington of US ambassadors serving in Europe and Russia.

According to The Post, some of the harassment can be characterized as routine, and involves Russian intelligence personnel conducting surveillance of American diplomats, taunting them at social events, or bribing local journalists to report negatively on their activities. But these pranks have allegedly become uglier and even criminal after 2014. The Post said that it had read “a series of secret memos” sent to the State Department by US embassies and consulates in Russia and Europe, which suggest that the increasing harassment of American diplomats is connected to the sanctions imposed by the US on Russia after its military intervention in Ukraine. In some instances, Russian intelligence operatives broke into the homes of American diplomats at night and rearranged the furniture, or turned on all the lights and electronic equipment before leaving. In another case, a US diplomat’s children were followed to school, while another’s car tires were slashed repeatedly, said the paper.

The State Department’s press secretary John Kirby told The Post that incidents of overt harassment of US diplomatic personnel by Russian government employees had indeed increased. Norm Eisen, America’s former ambassador to the Czech Republic, told the paper that the intimidation was part of “the gray war” between Washington and Moscow, which has escalated following Russia’s intervention in the Ukraine.

A statement from the Russian embassy in Washington denied that the Russian government was behind the alleged incidents. But it went on to state: “In diplomatic practice there is always the principle of reciprocity and, indeed, for the last couple of years our diplomatic staff in the United States has been facing certain problems”. This statement can be seen to imply that Russia is responding to instances of intimidation of its diplomats by US authorities. The statement added: “The deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations […] was not caused by us, but rather by the current [US] administration’s policy of sanctions and attempts to isolate Russia”. The Post said that US Secretary of State John Kerry raised the issued directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin during his visit to Moscow in March, but that the harassment has continued. US President Barack Obama is apparently aware of the situation, but has ordered US intelligence agencies “not to respond with similar measures against Russian diplomats”, said the paper.

Read the Original Article at Intel News