Urban Warfare, Back in the Day

URBAN WARFARE, BACK IN THE DAY

Current headlines are replete with stories of urban warfare. Be it Aleppo, Ramadi, Tripoli or some Ukrainian city you only learned of last year, there appears to be no shortage of combatants that want to fight in/over/for some piece of urban terrain. Perhaps a brief step back in to the history of urban warfare will generate some useful perspective.

On the Western Front in 1944, the August Allied sprint across France had quickly slowed to a methodical advance in September, in part because the Allied logistical system could not keep up. Part of that advance included the assault on Aachen, just across the German border and the first German city to fall on either the Eastern or Western Fronts.

A recovered Wehrmacht was putting up fierce resistance by October 1944 and most American forces were needed to hold the line. Only two infantry battalions from the 26th Infantry Regiment (1st Infantry Division) were available for the assault itself. American commanders did what came naturally: They substituted machines for men and emphasized firepower, heavily reinforcing the two infantry battalions with artillery, engineers, air support, and most importantly armor. M4 Shermans and M10 tank destroyers were integrated with the infantry down to the small-unit level, sometimes a single vehicle with a squad. Senior commanders even went as far as to assign each battalion an M12 self-propelled 155mm gun (not a howitzer) — a corps-level asset.

Two items can help us connect back to that time. The first is a rare photo of an M4 Sherman tank and an M10 tank destroyer together on the battlefield as they worked together in Aachen during the assault (below). The U.S. Army Signal Corps photo was probably never published, but can be found among the holdings of the National Archives and Records Administration. The second item is an account of the battle from one of the infantry battalion commanders that took the city, Lt. Col. Derrill Daniel. The Capture of Aachen was written by Daniel for a course he was taking at the Army’s Command and Staff College (Ft. Leavenworth) in the late 1940s. For both current and future historians, the digitization of old military school papers is a rich vein of primary sources, where one can read accounts of those who were there, but written when they had the time to do so without dodging incoming artillery.

The two battalions methodically advanced across the city, halting each night, employing firepower extensively and assuming every building was a German strongpoint until proven otherwise. It took 10 days to clear the city, and the two battalions suffered nearly 500 casualties (approximately 30 percent of authorized strength), but it was an impressive feat considering they were outnumbered 3 to 1 by the 5,000 German defenders.

In addition to the emphasis on machines and firepower, another American trait was key at Aachen — adaptability. U.S. forces had little experience in urban warfare to this point in the war. There was U.S. Army doctrine on urban warfare at that time (FM 31-50), but it had just come out in January 1944. While that doctrine got many things right, it was patently wrong about the role of armor in urban warfare, describing it as only occasionally useful when dealing with some enemy strongpoints. The Americans at Aachen had learned in the hedgerow country of Normandy that armor and infantry that wasn’t joined at the hip was critically vulnerable.

The designs of the M4 Sherman and M10 tank destroyer form an interesting subplot to the story of Aachen. The much-maligned Sherman did fare poorly against the more advanced German designs (e.g., Panther) in open terrain, but in a close-range urban fight supporting the infantry it was in its element — no coincidence considering the Army’s infantry branch had designed it for infantry support. In contrast, the M10 was designed to deal with enemy tanks, with little thought to combined arms. And yet, a role for the M10 was found as well. Its high-velocity 3-inch (76mm) gun worked better against targets with particularly thick walls, and the close cooperation with the infantry mitigated the vulnerabilities from its roofless turret.

The adaptability demonstrated by the American soldiers at Aachen can be traced back through many field manuals. The Field Service Regulations of 1923, for example, stated the expectation for men of all ranks to “show initiative in meeting different situations as they arise.” But one can argue that adaptability wasn’t so much a trait of the American military but American culture writ large. The American meritocracy has long given the freedom to innovate to a broad base of individuals.

As one ponders the many ongoing conflicts in urban terrain, consider the past. While factors such as equipment and force ratios certainly matter, less obvious elements such as a culture of innovation can also play a key role.

From Longbows to Spitfires – Nine Weapons that Made Britain Great

“Part of the country’s edge in its history of conflicts has been superior technology by land, sea, and air.” By Douglas Brown THE UNITED KINGDOM has seen its share of armed conflicts. In fact, few… The post From Longbows to Spitfires – Nine Weapons that Made Britain Great appeared first on MilitaryHistoryNow.com.

From Longbows to Spitfires – Nine Weapons that Made Britain Great — MilitaryHistoryNow.com

WORLD WAR 2 AXIS HELMETS

Lampshades and Soap

Romanian helmets of WW2

Adrian helmets

During the First World War battles Romania suffered heavily in infantries due to a big number of servicemen wounded in the head. So following an example of other countries at war in the Romanian Army, they came to a conclusion that it was necessary to equip their soldiers with battle helmets. To accomplish this, they purchased 90000 Adrian helmets (Le casque Adrian M1915) in France, and in the spring of 1917 they were already accepted for service. The helmets were painted in grey and blue color, an oval emblem with King Ferdinand I’s monogram was attached at the front – two crowned “F” characters. After Carol II came to power, the front emblem was replaced by a variant with a new leader monogram – two crowned “C” characters.

Helm Model 1916 for Romanian Army

Helm Model 1916 for Romanian Army

A 1916 model was also used at WW2 battles. For…

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Know Your Weapons: Grenades of WWII

Jumping on a Grenade? Make Sure It’s a German One!

 

Finally, we have the German Model 24, Steilhandgranate, or “stick handle grenade.” Also known as the “Potato Masher” by Allied forces. This grenade was an offensive type containing a charge between six and seven ounces for a large, concussive blast effect but its thin-walled canister produced very little shrapnel. This was in line with German infantry tactics at the time, which consisted of using these grenades to stun and shock enemy troops in a trench or emplacement until German troops could rush the position and overwhelm the defenders. Its very large size made it a bit unwieldy for an infantryman to carry but, among grenades of WWII, it was unmatched for throwing distance.

Gripping the bottom of its wooden handle and throwing it the grenade would spin in the air. With practice, the soldier could drop it on top of a target with great precision. There were several instances in WWII where German and American troops chucked grenades at each other at ranges under 50 yards. The Americans found that the Steilhandgranate’s concussion was indeed stunning while the Germans found the U.S. grenade was more lethal when it exploded. But the Potato Masher could be thrown farther and with better accuracy. In an enclosed space it was especially deadly with its whopping six-seven ounce charge, which could kill a man with the overpressure of the detonation. But there are numerous reports of the stick handle grenade going off just feet from U.S. troops in the open without them being seriously harmed. Outside of an enclosed space, its concussive power was mostly wasted.

The Steilhandgranate represented the operational philosophy of the German Army in the 1930s which held that the next war would also involve trench warfare and battles over towns and fixed fortifications. In such environments, an offensive grenade with a concussive punch would be useful. That was the war the Wehrmacht fought in France in 1940. But from there they went on to fight in the deserts of North Africa, the Italian mountains, and the vast steppes of Russia where this grenade was not very effective.

 

De Havilland DH.98 Mosquito Color Photographs Part II

Beautiful machine.

Part I Photo’s HERE.

Inch High Guy

A beautiful in-flight photograph of a Mosquito B Mk. IV. DK338 was later issued to No. 105 Squadron.

This is NT181, a Mosquito FB Mk. VI assigned to No. 620 Squadron at East Wretham.

NT181 again, from the front. The wear to the spinners and nacelle is interesting and would pose a challenge to the modeler.

Rockets proved especially effective against shipping. The armorers here wear leather jerkins, each man is attired slightly differently.

A Mosquito is “bombed up” with a little canine assistance. Compare the appearance of the bomb fins with that of the bomb bodies.

A South African Air Force FB Mk. VI of No. 60 Squadron photographed at Bari, Italy, September 1944. Note the spinners are different colors.

Another view of the same aircraft, serial number HP968.

One of the more attractive Mosquito schemes is the overall PRU Blue, as seen here worn by PR Mk. XVI…

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