In Memoriam: USS Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413)

USS Samuel B Roberts: World’s Deepest Shipwreck Discovered


The USS Samuel B Roberts (DE-413) went down during the Battle Off Samar in the Philippine Sea in October 1944.

It lies in 6,895m (22,621 ft) of water.

That’s Four Miles under the Pacific!

If you want to read an AMAZING account of the Sammy B’s Final Battle and how Destroyers and Destroyer Escorts like her took the fight to the Japanese Navy in WW2, check out The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailor’s by James D. Hornfischer.

Adm. Nimitz – 136th Birthday & USMC Raiders

Pacific Paratrooper

Pacific War Museum, Nimitz statue

Chester W. Nimitz was born on February 24, 1885 – and today would have been his 136th birthday. The National Museum of the Pacific War is located in Fredericksburg. Texas because Nimitz grew up here and he was a major figure in the U.S. victory over Japan in WWII.

Nimitz reached the pinnacle of naval leadership when he was promoted to the 5-star rank of Fleet Admiral in late 1944. As the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area, heledmore than two million men and women, 5,000 ships and 20,000 planes in the Pacific Theater.

Adm. Nimitz at the “Old Texas Roundup”

He was known to be a congenial and accessible leader and that sailors loved and respected him. He is pictured here at the “Old Texas Roundup” speaking to his guests - sailors, soldiers and Marines who hailed from Texas. The barbeque was held on…

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A Look At Iran’s Brown Water Navy

Informative piece. 👍

If there’s one thing to be gleaned from the current deteriorating situation in Iraq, its that this has forced Iran’s hand into acting overtly instead of working through proxies and expanding their influence via their Fifth Column, Hezbollah. 20 more words

via A Look At Iran’s Brown Water Navy — American Partisan

Japan’s Underwater Aircraft Carriers – part one

Amazing Read!

Pacific Paratrooper

Lieutenant Commander Stephen L. Johnson had a problem on his hands; a very large problem. His Balao-class submarine, the Segundo, had just picked up a large radar contact on the surface about 100 miles off Honshu, one of Japan’s home islands, heading south toward Tokyo.  World War II in the Pacific had just ended, and the ensuing cease fire was in its 14th day. The official peace documents would not be signed for several more days.

As Johnson closed on the other vessel, he realized it was a gigantic submarine, so large in fact that it first looked like a surface ship in the darkness. The Americans had nothing that size, so he realized that it had to be a Japanese submarine.

This was the first command for the lanky 29-year-old commander. He and his crew faced the largest and perhaps the most advanced submarine in the world…

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Military History: Chilcot and a Very British History of Dubious Military Decisions


The publication of the long-awaited report by Sir John Chilcot and his committee on Britain’s involvement in the 2003 invasion of Iraq proved more surprising and damning than expected. Many of the report’s conclusions confirmed what was widely understood to be the case. But the authoritative, exhaustive, and rigorous nature of the report has made those assumptions irrefutable. The Iraq invasion was of dubious legality, based on faulty intelligence, the result of poor strategic maneuvering by the government of Prime Minister Tony Blair, and exposed yet another failure of the political and military interface. If Britain’s military history is any guide, this will not be the last such failure.

In the days leading up to the publication, media reports repeatedly emphasized that it was beyond the remit of the inquiry to comment on the legality of the war. The report came as close to declaring the war to be illegal as was possible, without actually doing so. “The UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted,” the inquiry chair, Sir John Chilcot, said in his public statement. “Military action at that time was not a last resort.”

Although shocking to read in a public statement, there is nothing surprising for those of us who have taught the history of ethics and morality in war. The principle of Last Resort is one of the explicit principles of the Just War criteria. A war cannot be just if peaceful diplomatic alternatives exist as an alternative. Legal scholars and ethicists can debate the true meaning of this: Is it just to resort to war if diplomatic alternatives exist, but they are certain to fail? Blair, in 2002 and 2003, clearly believed this was the case, and continues to do so now.

But this forthright comment was not the only damning statement to emerge from the report. Again, much of this was no surprise. Intelligence failings were apparent, ranging from collection to analysis. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the British government was suffering from group-think at best, cognitive dissonance at worst. Chilcot highlights that the Joint Intelligence Committee failed to make clear that the intelligence on which the Blair government was basing its decisions was short of reliable. For its part, the Blair government failed to ask the necessary questions of the intelligence, choosing instead to believe wholeheartedly what was presented, and ignore the considerable caveats that any serious analysis would have revealed. “The judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction –  WMD –  were presented with a certainty that was not justified,” Chilcot concluded.

Read the Remainder at War on the Rocks